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A phenomenological description of the cinematic situation considers the film 
as a lived body. Just as the human lived body forms the basis for intentionality, 
perception, expression and action in the world, the film’s body – its technologi-
cal and instrumental dimension – forms the basis for the films perceptual and 
expressive engagement with the world. Technological methods and processes 
thus correlate with modalities of thought and consciousness.1
We do not ‘lose ourselves’ in the film, so much as we exist – emerge, really – in 
the contact between our body and the film’s body. It is not a matter of simply 
identifying with the characters on screen, or with the body of the director or 
camera operator, for example. Rather, we are in a relationship of intimate, 
tactile, reversible contact with the film’s body – a complex relationship that 
is marked as often by tension as by alignment, by repulsion as often as by 
attraction.2
Phenomenology can offer a resource for queer studies insofar as it emphasises 
the importance of lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, the 
significance of nearness or what is ready-to-hand, and the role of repeated and 
habitual actions in shaping bodies and worlds.3
Phenomenological debates around cinema put the ‘lived body’ at the centre 
of inquiry – this includes the body of the viewer and the body of the f ilm. 
Herein lies f ilm phenomenology’s most exciting appeal. In responding 
critically to accounts of the cinematic experience as abstract, disembodied, 
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illusory, and substitutive (put forward by psychoanalytic as well as Marxist/
ideological f ilm criticism in particular4), it is the embodied nature of our 
engagement with cinema that is foregrounded. All kinds of bodies ‘matter’ 
within this area of critical debate – or, to put it more cautiously, they should 
matter. The aim of this paper is to begin to explore one of the perhaps 
marginalised areas within debates around film and embodiment: questions 
of embodied difference.
From the outset, I want to make clear that this is by no means an attempt 
to reintroduce essentialising notions of ‘natural’ biological differences of 
gender or race, for instance. Rather, the aim is to suggest that contemporary 
work on cinema, embodiment, and affect could benefit from a more explicit 
acknowledgement of the signif icance of embodied and ‘lived’ difference, 
of differences in affective experiences and memories, of ways of being-in-
the-world and therefore perceiving the world. We need to account more 
eff iciently for the ways in which cinema ‘touches’ and ‘moves’ us differently.
This article will develop a theoretical argument – that is, an argument 
about theoretical developments within film studies and the potential result-
ant directions. Specif ically, I will argue that contemporary work on f ilm 
and embodiment might benefit from drawing on the insights of feminist 
and queer engagements with phenomenological questions of embodiment. 
Without calling into question the significance of existing phenomenological 
approaches to f ilm,5 I want to focus on some of the marginalised and less 
developed areas within this f ield. With the help of Sara Ahmed’s Queer 
Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others in particular, I want to draw 
attention to the ‘straightforward’ orientation of f ilm phenomenology and 
point to manners in which an acknowledgement of queer orientations and 
ways of being-in-the-world further open up the conceptual and political 
possibilities provided by the turn towards embodiment, lived experience, 
and affect within f ilm criticism.
Although the approach developed here could be applied to any f ilm, 
there are, as Vivian Sobchack argues, certain f ilms that engage the ‘sense-
making capacities of our bodies’ more explicitly than others.6 It is the ratio 
of the explicit engagement of body and mind that varies from film to f ilm or 
from genre to genre. However, I also want to suggest that there are certain 
kinds of viewers that might be more open to a sensuous and embodied 
engagement with cinema. Sobchack argues that we ‘see and comprehend 
and feel f ilms with our entre bodily being, informed by the full history and 
carnal knowledge of our acculturated sensorium’.7 This understanding of 
our perceptive relations to the world and cinema as culturally and histori-
cally specif ic, as situated and ‘acculturated’, implies that different carnal 
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histories and knowledges would be linked to differences in our ‘sensorium’, 
and as such to differences in our engagement with cinema.
We are likely to be more open to the tactile or kinaesthetic dimen-
sions of the cinematic experience if we have a particular history of tactile 
or kinaesthetic engagement with the world – that is, if we have come to 
embody a particularly tactile or kinaesthetic way of being-in-the-world. 
The ‘sense-making capacities’ of our bodies might also be more readily 
engaged if we are not provided with traditional cinematic pleasures or 
points of engagement. As the literature on queering and appropriation 
has shown, we can still take pleasure in f ilms even when we are not given 
opportunities for identif ication or desire in relation to specific characters.8 I 
would like to add an embodied, phenomenological dimension to this debate. 
Phenomenological approaches to cinema allow us to re-think what it is that 
we are able to recognise, relate to, and identify within our encounter with 
cinema – a point I will elaborate further.
The argument developed in the f irst part of this article will be illustrated 
with reference to queer cinema and with a specific focus on Cracks (2009) by 
Jordan Scott, a f ilm with explicitly lesbian characters and an explicit lesbian 
storyline. I will argue that the pleasures that queer audiences might take 
from the f ilm are most usefully identif ied by an emphasis on sensuousness 
and bodily affect – and, that they are less likely to be found in the realm of 
the (psychic) identif ications and desires available in relation to characters 
and storyline, for instance.
Cracks deploys a range of ‘negative’ lesbian stereotypes (exemplif ied 
by Eva Green’s character, Miss G, a predatory lesbian teacher at a boarding 
school for girls) and ends in death and devastation. An articulation of the 
pain and violence inflicted on queer characters by heteronormative and 
homophobic social structures can of course be useful and is important in 
highlighting continuing inequalities. This in itself can be ‘pleasurable’ in 
the sense that one’s identity position and a marginalised and disadvan-
taged socio-cultural status is acknowledged and made visible. However, 
an acknowledgement of the sensuous, embodied, and affective nature of 
our encounter with cinema provides a more comprehensive account of the 
pleasures and points of engagement offered – especially when differences 
in our orientations, embodiments, ways of being-in-the-world, as well as 
our perceptive and expressive relations to the world and others are taken 
into account.
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Turning towards the body
The reasons for a turn away from an exclusive emphasis on optical vi-
sion and ‘the gaze’ and towards the body as a whole, towards questions of 
embodiment and perception, and towards the interrelated nature of the 
senses, are, generally speaking, two-fold: concerns about the embodied 
nature of f ilm and the f ilm experience are linked both to changes in f ilm-
making practices (and a critical concern with those practices9) as well as to 
developments in theorising about f ilm (that are partially related to changes 
in cinematic technologies and practices, but mainly to critiques of existing 
theories10). This includes, for instance, concerns over the gendered and ra-
cialised implications of established conceptualisations and manifestations 
of the gaze – both within cinema and also within the wider socio-cultural 
context, where looking (from a distance) is associated and inscribed with 
various hierarchies of power and control.
Conceptualising our encounter with cinema in terms of voyeurism, 
narcissism, and fetishism, as well as in terms of symbolically and ideologi-
cally constituted subject positions, tends to replicate dominant symbolic 
structures and power hierarchies and provides only limited possibilities 
for an understanding of the various points of engagement and viewing 
pleasures on offer – in relation to specif ic f ilms and to cinema as a whole. 
Donna Haraway suggests that the gaze, including the human gaze and its 
various technological incarnations, ‘signif ies the unmarked positions of 
Man and White [in] scientific and technological, late-industrial, militarized, 
racist, male-dominant societies’.11 She goes on to say that ‘eyes’, including 
those artif icially constructed as well as our organic ones, constitute ‘active 
perceptual systems, building on specif ic ways of seeing, that is, ways of life’ 
that provide ‘highly specif ic visible possibilities, each with a wonderfully 
detailed, active, partial way of organising worlds’.12 This is why Haraway 
calls for an acknowledgement of the situated, partial, and embodied nature 
of vision and knowledge, by pointing to the need to ‘reclaim the sensory 
system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into 
a conquering gaze from nowhere’.13
Importantly, Haraway points to the interrelated nature of the senses 
(that is, to the ‘sensory system’ that makes possible our contact and engage-
ment with the world) and she develops explicit links between modes of 
perception and the different worlds we might perceive and experience. 
With this in mind, it is important to acknowledge that f ilm viewing and film 
theorising do not take place in an abstract, ahistorical, and disembodied 
realm (as psychoanalytic f ilm theory would have us believe). Vision and 
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technologies of vision, including cinema, have very real and material 
implications. They discipline and shape bodies, relations between bodies, 
and bodily experiences, in addition to modes of being-in-the-word as well 
as the ‘world’ itself in fundamental ways.
Phenomenological approaches to f ilm are useful in that, rather than 
strictly opposing approaches based on optical vision, distance, and ‘the 
gaze’, they complement existing theories. From a phenomenological per-
spective, it is the body with its expressive and perceptive qualities that 
constitutes the necessary condition for looking, identif ication, emotions, 
and pleasure. After all, it is the material body that makes looking and other 
sensory engagements with the world (including cinema) possible in the 
f irst place. It is at the level of the body that meaning is constituted; it is 
where we ‘apprehend’ the world and make ‘sense’ of environmental and 
physical stimuli.
Building on the work of Laura Marks and Sobchack, Jennifer Barker takes 
such an approach in The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience. 
She argues that
a phenomenological approach to the cinematic experience … focuses neither 
solely on the formal and narrative features of the f ilm itself, nor solely on the 
spectator’s psychic identif ication with characters or cognitive interpretation 
of the f ilm. Instead, phenomenological f ilm analysis approaches the f ilm 
and the viewer as acting together, correlationally, along an axis that would 
itself constitute the object of study.14
This kind of approach can go some way in explaining how/why we might 
enjoy and derive particular kinds of pleasures from a f ilm – even if it does 
not provide us with possibilities for identif ication in relation to particular 
characters and what they stand for and/or in relation to particular narrative 
structures and trajectories. Following Merleau-Ponty, Barker argues that 
f ilm and viewer are in a ‘relationship of reversibility’ and that viewer and 
f ilm ‘inhabit and enact embodied structures – tactile structures – that are 
not the same, but intimately related and reversible’.15
She goes on to provide a fascinating and compellingly detailed explora-
tion of what Sobchack calls the ‘common structures of embodied existence 
[and] similar modes of being-in-the-world’16 that we share with cinema and 
that cinema shares with us. Barker goes beneath the skin (of the viewer 
and the f ilm) in her account of the tactile dimensions of the cinematic 
experience and locates the ‘contact’ between viewer and f ilm at the level 
of ‘skin’, and (delving further into the murky depth of the body) at the 
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level of ‘musculature’ and ‘viscera’. While ‘skin’, following Marks’ notion of 
haptic visuality, is linked to surface and texture and to notions of eroticism 
and contact with the other, ‘musculature’ is linked to particular spatial 
structures, to ways of taking up, moving through, and extending space, and 
as such, to notions of kinaesthetic empathy, agency, and desire. ‘Viscera’, 
according to Barker, is linked to the rhythms in the most hidden depths of 
the body, and thus to temporal structures, to particular ways of experienc-
ing, understanding, and embodying time that might lead to a ‘visceral 
resonance’ between viewer and f ilm.17 Barker’s account is invaluable in its 
detailing of the various levels and layers at which our contact (or encounter) 
with f ilm can be located, both in terms of (human) bodies within f ilm as 
well as with the body of f ilm itself.
Barker’s argument is based, at least partially, on an understanding of the 
relationship between viewer and f ilm in terms of its mimetic dimensions. 
On the one hand, cinematic gestures and movements have emerged based 
on human gestures and movements. For instance, the close-up mimics the 
human gesture of leaning forward in order to get a ‘closer look’. Conversely, 
we, as viewers, might mimic cinematic gestures or adjust our bodies in 
response to cinematic movements, as when we lean to one side in response 
to the erratic and swerving movements of a chase sequence. More generally, 
‘f ilm and viewer share certain deep-seated muscular habits, beginning 
with the very tendency to move through the world in an upright position. 
We and the f ilm are both inclined that way, as we are inclined to move and 
look forward, to face things directly’.18
Modes of movement and comportment are also associated with par-
ticular affective implications, as they provide the basis for our expressive 
and perceptive relations to the world. Barker suggests that ‘swaggering, 
skulking, cowering, reaching, f linching, swaying, swerving, leaning or 
simply standing upright’,19 for instance, are simultaneously expressive and 
perceptive acts that articulate how we affect and how we are affected by 
objects and others. They are ways of orienting ourselves and arranging our 
body in space, and they take place in relation to our encounters with other 
bodies (human and cinematic).
Developing a similar (although perhaps more cognitive-based) argument, 
Carl Plantinga in Moving Viewers asserts the importance of accounting more 
specif ically for what he calls the ‘pre-rational elements of spectatorship, in 
other words, responses that are to some extent automatic, pre-reflective 
body responses, rather than the intentional and interpretive cognitions 
of the conscious mind’.20 In particular, he focuses on the phenomenon of 
‘motor mimicry’ as one aspect of the pre-rational element of spectatorship 
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that is ‘the tendency of an observer to outwardly mimic the facial and body 
movements of another person’.21
Motor mimicry is associated with affective mimicry and bodily empathy. 
For instance, we may not only experience sadness when we know why a 
particular character in a f ilm cries (based on information provided through 
dialog and narrative); we may also experience, and exhibit, particular 
emotions when we see them displayed through characters’ facial expres-
sions, gestures, and movements, which we then mimic. While Plantinga 
focuses mainly on the affective and embodied relationships we might 
develop towards characters in f ilms, this argument can usefully be related 
to Sobchack’s and Barker’s notion of the body of f ilms, including cinematic 
gestures, movements, and modes of comportment, as outlined above. This 
argument also contributes to unpacking the ways in which ‘emotional 
contagion’ might work – both in relation to characters in f ilms and in rela-
tion to the cinematic experience as a whole.
Antonio Damasio’s account of the workings of consciousness and emo-
tions from a neurobiological perspective is insightful here, as he points to 
the wide-ranging physiological changes taking place in the body (including 
muscular-postural and muscular-visceral-endocrine adjustments) in our 
affective encounters with objects and others – most of which we cannot 
consciously control. Importantly, Damasio also suggest that ‘the records 
we hold of the objects and events we once perceived include the motor 
adjustments we made to obtain the perception in the f irst place and also 
include the emotional reactions we had then’.22 This is why certain bodily 
responses are not only evoked when we perceive an object or person, but 
also when we merely think of or remember an object or person – and further, 
when we witness particular expressions of emotions in other bodies, both 
human and cinematic.
Whose body?
What is perhaps slightly problematic about Barker’s work as well as other 
writing in this area is that it is based on seemingly unproblematic, uni-
versalising, and at times paradoxically ahistorical understandings of the 
body and embodiment. Despite the emphasis on the materiality of the 
body and its concrete functioning, it is the white, male, heterosexual body 
that is implicitly at the heart of the theoretical underpinnings of much 
contemporary f ilm phenomenology. Elena del Rio asserts that ‘the kind 
of phenomenology practiced by Merleau-Ponty falls short of considering 
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the body in particularly gendered ways by simply assuming the white, 
male body as the universal measure of all bodies’.23 Arguing along similar 
lines, Ahmed suggests that Husserl’s phenomenology seems to involve an 
‘ease of movement’ that implies a ‘mobile body’, one that ‘can do’ things.24 
Ahmed identif ies the taken-for-granted ways of being-in-the-world at the 
heart of phenomenology in terms of heterosexuality and in terms of white-
ness. The mobile body that can do things, that is characterised by an ease 
of movement, and for whom space constitutes the possibility of action, 
desire, and contact, is a body that takes up a very particular orientation 
towards the world and others that is based on the normative embodiment 
of heterosexuality and whiteness.
This normative (white, male, heterosexual, and able) body also inad-
vertently underpins phenomenological f ilm criticism – a point I want to 
illustrate in more detail. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Barker conceptualises 
our encounter with cinema in terms of tactility and contact:
Tactility is a mode of perception and expression wherein all parts of the 
body commit themselves to, or are drawn into, a relationship with the world 
that is at once a mutual and intimate relation of contact. The intimate and 
close contact between touching and touched, as well as the relationship 
of mutual, reciprocal relationship that exists between them, are universal 
structures …. Cinematic tactility, then, is a general attitude towards the 
cinema that the human body enacts in particular ways: haptically, at the 
tender surface of the body; kinaesthetically and muscularly, in the middle 
dimension of muscles, tendons and bones that reach toward and through 
cinematic space; and viscerally, in the murky recesses of the body, where 
heart, lungs, pulsing f luids, and f iring synapses receive, respond to, and 
reenact the rhythms of cinema.25
Feminist, gender, and queer studies critiques of traditional phenomenol-
ogy articulate the grounds on which we might challenge the ‘universal 
structures’ and ‘general attitude’ that arguably underpin our perceptive 
and expressive relations to the world (and to cinema). Various ways of 
being-in-the-world are linked to differences in our tactile and kinaesthetic 
encounters with objects and others. For instance, using the notion of ‘sexual 
orientation’ as a starting point, Ahmed points to how different ways of being 
orientated (phenomenologically) mean that we ‘face’ the world and others 
differently; it means that different objects and others come ‘into view’ and 
are therefore ‘within reach’. In particular, she emphasises the spatiality of 
sexuality and points to the idea that ‘sexuality involves ways of inhabiting 
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and being inhabited by space’ and is related to ‘ways of inhabiting and 
coexisting in the world’.26
Queer ways of being-in-the-world are therefore characterised by dif-
ferences in our relationships to space. We extend space differently based 
on how we are orientated in the world. This is why sexuality should not 
be seen as determined only by object choice, but as involving differences 
in one’s very relation to the world – that is, how one ‘faces’ the world or is 
directed toward it. Or rather, we could say that orientations towards sexual 
objects affect other things that we do, such that different orientations and 
different ways of directing one’s desire means inhabiting different worlds’.27 
Different ways of being-in-the-world mean that different objects and oth-
ers are at-hand, within ‘reach’, and familiar in the Heideggerian sense of 
the term. It also means that some objects and others are out of sight and 
not within reach. As such, our different ways of being orientated and of 
extending space open up (or close down) different possibilities for action 
and desire and for affecting and being affected by others. Importantly, such 
an understanding of (sexual) orientation engenders compelling new ways 
of thinking about the representability of queer identities and subjectivities 
(in cinema and elsewhere), in addition to new ways of conceptualising the 
identif ications, pleasures, and points of engagement available for queer 
audiences in cinema.
Elaborating on the affective dimensions of different orientations and 
suggesting that emotions towards objects and others involve ‘affective forms 
of (re)orientation’, Ahmed explains that
it is not just that bodies are moved by the orientations they have; rather, the 
orientation we have toward others shape the contours of space by affecting 
relations of proximity and distance between bodies …. Orientations involve 
different ways of registering the proximity of objects and others. Orienta-
tions shape not only how we inhabit space, but how we apprehend this world 
of shared inhabitance, as well as ‘who’ or ‘what’ we direct our energy and 
attention towards.28
Queer bodies are characterised by facing the ‘wrong’ way, by tending to-
wards ‘inappropriate’ others and directing their attention towards ‘deviant’ 
objects. This means that queer ways of being-in-the-world are characterised 
not only by tactile, kinaesthetic, or muscular relations to different others, 
but also by differences in the experience of proximity, contact, touch, and 
movement itself. Linking this back to cinema, a queer sense-ibility can be 
articulated not only by the representation of tactile relations to ‘inappropri-
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ate’ others, but also by differences in the articulation of tactility and contact 
itself. Not only do we touch and are touched by different, ‘inappropriate’ 
objects and others, but we touch and are touched differently. Not only do 
we move and ‘tend towards’ different, ‘inappropriate’ objects and others, 
but we move and extend space differently.
Queer bodies live their tactile, muscular, and kinaesthetic relations to 
objects and others differently. So if, as Sobchack and Barker suggest, we can 
conceive of cinema as a ‘lived body’ that shares our structures of embodied 
existence and modes of being-in-the world, including various gestures and 
modes of movement and comportment, then queer subjectivities can be 
articulated by and identif ied in relation to not just characters in f ilm but 
the body f ilm itself and our embodied relationships with that body.
With reference to both Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy, as well as to Judith Butler’s phenomenological account of gender as 
a repetition of bodily acts,29 Ahmed adopts a model of history as ‘bodily 
sedimentation’. She argues that ‘phenomenology helps us to explore how 
bodies are shaped by histories, which they perform in their comportment, 
their posture and their gesture’.30 It should become clear at this point what a 
queer f ilm phenomenology might look like and what shape it might take, as 
well as the kinds of conceptual and political possibilities it opens up. Rather 
than conceptualising our tactile, muscular, and kinaesthetic encounter 
with cinema in universalising terms (as Barker does, at least to a certain 
extent), an acknowledgement of the ways in which our embodied histories 
and habits shape our expressive and perceptive relations with the world 
and others adds a vital element of specif icity – without, as I would like to 
re-emphasise, rehashing essentialising notions of bodily difference.
Re-thinking identity and identification
In The Address of the Eye, Sobchack calls for a return to questions of identi-
f ication from a phenomenological point of view: ‘[w]e might wish to think 
again about processes of identification in the f ilm experience, relating them 
not only to our secondary engagement with and recognition of “subject posi-
tions” or characters but rather to our primary engagement (and the f ilm’s) 
with the sense and sensibility of materiality itself.’31 I want to follow Kate 
Ince in suggesting that the rather old-fashioned concepts of identity and 
identif ication (laden as they are with all kinds of ideological baggage) can 
regain signif icance if we move away from their largely abstract, ahistorical, 
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decontextualised, and disembodied incarnations and move towards an 
understanding of ‘embodied cultural identity’ within f ilm criticism.
Ince follows Sobchack in suggesting a move away from a Lacanian 
understanding of primary and secondary identif ication as always involv-
ing a specular image (and the ways this has been taken up by Jean-Louis 
Baudry and Christian Metz, for instance) to argue for an understanding of 
identif ication based on the ‘sensational body’. She proposes that identif ica-
tion ‘is not specular at f irst, but “affective”’, that specular identif ication 
can only take place on the ‘ground of a preliminary affection’32, and that 
it is from our embodied, affective relations with the world and others that 
various forms of identif ication emerge.
Such an understanding of identity (formation) and identif ication allows 
us to re-think our engagement with cinema in ‘sensational’ terms. Films 
not only provide possibilities for (psychic) identif ication with particular 
characters, they also open up possibilities for identif ication with affective 
situations that are constructed both through characters and narrative, 
but also through various (cinematic) movements, gestures, textures, or 
rhythms. In a similar vein, Misha Kavka points to the usefulness of thinking 
about ‘situational identif ications that are affect based’ when she argues that 
we tend to ‘project ourselves into the scenario there where the affective 
flow feels most “true”’. 33 In this sense, the screen functions as a permeable 
membrane between different ‘affective worlds’ that communicates this 
sensibility viscerally, through movement, gestures, colours, and sound.
Various points of identif ication are on offer in our encounter with 
cinema, as we can identify with particular ways of being-in-the-world, 
particular orientations, and particular affective situations. These can 
be based on our embodied experiences and memories, our sedimented 
histories of accumulated affect, our acculturated sensorium, and the ways in 
which we extend space and time and relate to objects and others. The bodies 
in and of cinema embody and express our different attitudes, tendencies, 
habits, and orientations, and this is where possibilities for our embodied, 
sensuous, and affective engagements with cinema partially lie.
Cracks
I would now like to illustrate the ideas outlined here with reference to 
Cracks. While this approach could be applied to any f ilm, queer cinema 
provides a particularly useful starting point. With Cracks, I want to suggest 
that the f ilm’s most powerful appeal lies in its articulation of particularly 
queer orientations and ways of being-in-the-world that provide opportuni-
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ties for recognition and identif ication in tactile, muscular, and kinaesthetic 
terms.
In her discussion of the signif icance of lesbian f ilms in the context of 
queer cinema, Anat Pick writes that ‘screening lesbianism is not simply a 
matter of making the invisible visible, but of negotiating different regimes of 
visibility [and, I would like to add, different sensuous regimes]’. She asserts 
that we ‘need to interrogate marginal sexual identities not only as subject 
matter, but also as a stance, as a process of reinscription, as a way of situating 
oneself in relation to sets of images, experiences and historical formations’.34 
What I want to focus on here is the embodied and bodily dimension of this 
‘stance’.
Following Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology, taking up a particular stance 
means adopting a particular orientation towards the world; it means not 
only that we see/experience the world from a particular situated location, 
but that we ‘face’ the world in a particular way. What I will explore in 
relation to Cracks is not only the kind of stance, or orientation, embodied 
by the characters in the f ilm, but also the ways in which the f ilm ‘faces’ us 
by taking up a particular stance and embodying a particular orientation; 
what kind of ‘affective world’ is articulated in and through the f ilm?
Cracks is situated in 1930s England and takes place in a boarding school 
for girls. Miss G (Eva Green) is a teacher at the institution as well as the 
coach of the school’s diving team. The narrative tensions and resulting 
‘love triangle’ evolve around Miss G and her fascination with and desire for 
her student Fiamma (Maria Valverde), as well as one of the other student’s 
(Di, played by Juno Temple) crush on Miss G and jealousy of Miss G’s (un-
requited) desire for Fiamma. However, rather than focusing on characters 
or narrative, I want to explore the signif icance of the numerous sequences 
that take place in the lake in which the girls train. It is the depiction of 
bodily movement in and through water and the relations of bodies in water 
that provide the f ilm’s most explicit articulation of queer ways of being-in-
the-world and the kinds of ‘affective flows’ that might resonate with queer 
viewers in particular.
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Fig. 1 Affective flows
The quality of the ‘matter’ in which this movement of bodies occurs, and 
the ways in which bodily movement changes the arrangement of elements 
in the surrounding space, is made ‘visible’ through the camera’s positioning 
underwater. The air bubbles and sun rays, f loating through the water and 
past the bodies and the camera, emphasise the substance of the space in 
which movement occurs. The underwater sequences highlight the muscular 
efforts of movement and point to the resistance to movement that can be 
experienced in muscular terms (when particular movements are slower and 
much more strenuous in water than they are in the air). It is the tactile qual-
ity of the experience of moving in water that is foregrounded in particular. 
We are always consciously aware of the continuous contact between our 
skin and water because we are not used to it – it is unfamiliar, in ways in 
which our skin’s continuous contact with air is not. Ahmed, drawing on 
Heidegger’s account of ‘familiarity’, explains that familiarity is central to 
the notion of being orientated.35 The underwater sequences can thus be read 
and felt as articulations of a sense of disorientation, of unfamiliar ways of 
being-in-the word, and of non-normative or queer orientations toward the 
world and toward others.
The materiality of water also becomes particularly poignant when the 
characters open their eyes underwater. Looking in/through water gives 
the gaze a particularly haptic quality, as the materiality of the medium or 
‘matter’ that touches and connects the bodies is emphasised. Air is often 
‘invisible’, whereas water is not. What is articulated here is a different kind 
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of looking, one that is explicitly linked to the sense of touch: the water both 
touches the eye the floating bodies, and the consistency and materiality of 
water becomes ‘visible’ as we look through it (along with the characters). 
It is not the distance implied by the gaze that is highlighted but rather 
closeness, proximity, and contact.
In a number of sequences taking place in or around the lake the surface 
of the water also constitutes a threshold, where anything that is below this 
surface is unknown, both fascinating and perhaps threatening, especially 
if the camera and we as viewers remain above the surface. This becomes a 
threshold that we cannot see through. For instance, in one diving sequence, 
Miss G forces Fiamma to perform another dive when she is too exhausted 
to do so. Miss G’s cruelty in this scene can be linked to Fiamma’s refusal to 
reciprocate Miss G’s approaches. Fiamma is forced to cross the threshold 
constituted by the surface of the water and enter into an unknown, threat-
ening world. We remain on the platform along with the other characters 
and share their concern as to whether Fiamma will resurface, which she 
does after a considerable length of time.
Water can be associated with a sense of disorientation because it implies 
a threshold into a different world, one in which normative and familiar rules 
of gravity and bodily movement do not apply. When we are in water our 
senses have to adjust because the normative and familiar rules of perception 
and expression become irrelevant. Our sensory relationship with the world 
changes dramatically, including our sense of vision, hearing, touch, smell, 
and taste, but also our kinaesthetic and muscular senses as well as our 
proprioceptive sense (our sense of our own bodily weight and the sense of 
the position of our body in space). This queer sense of space is articulated 
both through the movement of bodies in water as well as through the 
positioning and movement of the camera (underwater) that seems to be 
free from the familiar rules of gravity and comportment. We do not always 
know what is up or down, left or right, as the camera, the human bodies, the 
air bubbles, and the rays of light float freely and in seemingly unrestricted 
fashion, connected by the malleable materiality of water.
As such, the underwater sequences might lead to a sense of disorien-
tation: when we are in water, we are not ‘in our element’ and we do not 
experience the world in familiar ways. We need to re-orient ourselves in 
order to f ind or re-gain our bearings. However, there are certain characters 
who seem to be ‘in their element’, ‘at ease’, or ‘at home’ when they are moving 
(and looking) in and through water. There is a sense in which they (and we 
as viewers) might experience a pleasurable and exhilarating sense of diso-
rientation, of not knowing what direction we face, of not being restricted 
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in our movement by the pull of gravity. When we are underwater we are 
also not being ‘directed’ in particular ways – we can f ind our own way and 
we do not have to follow the ‘path most trodden’.
The masses of water that constitute space are explicitly and visibly mal-
leable; they ‘take the shape’ of the bodies that inhabit it. Ahmed argues 
that spaces are not exterior to the body, but that space is ‘like a second 
skin’ that unfolds in the folds of the body.36 She also makes reference to the 
‘skin of the social’ that makes impressions on and shapes the surface of the 
body, directing it in particularly heteronormative ways. What the smooth 
and comfortable movement underwater makes ‘visible’, then, is the ways 
in which queer bodies, those that do not ‘f it’ the skin of the social, are ‘in 
their element’ within a space that is unmarked and fluid.
Ahmed argues that when bodies extend space comfortably, space 
constitutes the possibility for action and desire – and it is in this regard 
that the f ilm’s depiction of bodies in water embodies particularly queer 
possibilities. The underwater sequences in particular function to articulate 
a sense of the queer affective relations between bodies that are ‘in touch’ 
and ‘in sync’ within a space that f its their shape and that provides a ground 
on which bodies can ‘gather’ and ‘tend toward’ each other. This includes the 
bodies in the f ilm, the body of the f ilm, as well as the body of the viewer.
What characterises Cracks, then, is that although it largely conforms to 
mainstream cinematic conventions, and although the female body and the 
relationships between the female characters are often heterosexualised and 
posited for a heterosexually desiring gaze in very traditional and stereo-
typical terms (and water dripping off the female body is certainly part of 
this), the f ilm also manages to articulate particularly queer subjectivities. 
These possibilities exist outside of traditional binaries of identif ication 
and desire; they exist in relation to the f ilm’s embodied articulation of 
subjectivity and desire (sexual and otherwise) that might ‘resonate’ with 
certain viewers based on their own embodiments of subjectivity and ways 
of being-in-the-world, and based on their own kinaesthetic, muscular, and 
tactile memories, experiences, and habits.
Cracks might also appeal to, touch, or move viewers based on their em-
bodied aspirations and ‘tendencies’. Borrowing Patricia White’s argument 
in Uninvited, this is to say that f ilms might not only speak to, touch, or move 
already-formed identities, but that they might play a part in their formation 
and their ‘becoming’. Ahmed’s phenomenological discussion of ‘tenden-
cies’ (that recalls Butler’s notion of performativity) provides an embodied 
dimension to this argument: ‘[b]odies are shaped by what they tend toward 
and the repetition of this “tending toward” produces certain tendencies.’37 
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What I want to suggest, then, is that the f ilm can be read and ‘felt’ as an 
articulation of particularly queer orientations and tendencies. It focuses 
on ‘minor’ characters (in the sense suggested by White in her discussion of 
lesbian minor cinema38); also, the f ilm in part traces the processes through 
which the characters acquire certain ‘queer’ tendencies and orientations 
by ‘tending toward’ certain others in ways that disrupt the straightness of 
phenomenal space, and ways of inhabiting that space. Particularly in those 
moments that focus on bodily movement in, through, towards, and with 
water, the f ilm itself, as I have tried to show, ‘embodies’ those tendencies, 
orientations, dis-orientations, and re-orientations.
This opens up possibilities for embodied viewer engagements with the 
process of acquiring certain tendencies and orientations, of extending space 
and ‘facing’ others in particular ways, and of disrupting straightforward 
understandings and experiences of phenomenal space. This is why the f ilm 
might speak to, touch, move, and resonate with viewers that are not entirely 
comfortable, ‘at home’, or ‘in their element’ within the heteronormative 
structures of phenomenal space and the possibilities for action and desire 
it provides.
So what?
Kavka argues that affects do not reside in bodies but rather arise between 
bodies.39 Embodied engagements and affective identif ications therefore 
depend on the interplay between a range of bodies: between bodies on and 
off screen, where the screen functions as an affective surface, a permeable 
membrane that allows for the relations between bodies and between the 
‘affective worlds’ on either side of the screen; and between the body of 
the spectator and the body of the f ilm. Affects are economic in that they 
circulate between bodies and create alignments and attachments.40 The 
political signif icance of cinema can therefore be located, at least in part, 
in the ways in which certain f ilms provide opportunities for the alignment 
of, and attachment between, certain kinds of bodies.
Queer bodies might gather in and around certain f ilms and form the 
basis for a sense of community through shared alignments, attachments, 
and orientations. We might think of community and identity in terms of 
shared affects, tendencies, and habits; and of cinema as giving expression 
to, and resonating with, particular histories of bodily sedimentation. With 
this in mind, a phenomenological approach to cinema that accounts for 
embodied differences allows us to think about our various encounters with 
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cinema, including pleasures, frustrations, tensions, alignments, repulsions, 
mobilisations, and attractions in non-essentialising terms, while not losing 
sight of the body that makes these encounters possible in the f irst place.
Notes
1. Del Rio 2009, p. 112.
2. Barker 2009, pp. 18-19.
3. Ahmed 2006, p. 2.
4. Del Rio 2012, pp. 11-12.
5. See Sobchack 1992 & 2004 and Barker 2009.
6. Sobchack 2004, p. 62.
7. Sobchack 2004, p. 63.
8. See White 1999.
9. Marks’ exploration of what she terms ‘intercultural cinema’ in The Skin of the Film (2000) 
is a key example here.
10. Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye (1991) is another key reference point.
11. Haraway 1997, p. 283.
12. Haraway 1997, pp. 258-259, emphasis added. To a large extent, this argument holds true 
in the context of digital technologies and the possibilities for (re-)presentation that they 
provide. For example, we continue to speak of the ‘camera’ even when referring to digitally-
created scenes or f ilms. As established, analog methods of ‘shooting’ or ‘framing’ tend to 
be replicated in the digital realm.
13. Haraway 1997, p. 283.
14. Barker 2009, p. 18.
15. Ibid.
16. Sobchack 1992, p. 5.
17. Barker 2009, p. 123.
18. Barker 2009, p. 81.
19. Barker 2009, p.77.
20. Plantinga 2009, p. 112.
21. Plantinga 2009, p. 124. Recent research on mirror neurons has begun exploring the neurologi-
cal basis for this phenomenon.
22. Damasio 2000, pp. 147-148.
23. Del Rio 2009, p. 114.
24. Ahmed 2006, p. 138.
25. Barker 2009, p. 3, emphasis added.
26. Ahmed 2006, p. 67.
27. Ahmed 2006, p. 77.
28. Ahmed 2006, p. 3.
29. See Butler 1997.
30. Ahmed 2006, p. 56.
31. Sobchack 2004, p. 65.
32. Ince 2011, pp. 4-5.
33. See Kavka 2012.
34. Pick 2004, p. 115, emphasis added.
216
NECSUS – EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MEDIA STUDIES
NECSUS #2, 2012, VOL. 1, NO. 2, ‘TANGIBILIT Y’
35. Ahmed 2006, pp. 6-7.
36. Ahmed 2006, p. 9.
37. Ahmed 2006, p. 129.
38. See White 2008.
39. See Kavka 2012.
40. See Ahmed 2001.
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